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INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the federal courts have heard
arguments in contract disputes involving billions of dollars worth of
securitized financial products—yet it is not clear that the federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction over these cases.
In these “default disputes,” sophisticated financial parties owning
securities in different tranches of the same securitized financial instrument
(SFI) litigate over whether an event of default has occurred and whether the
alleged event requires liquidation of the SFI. Events of default and
liquidations give some security holders better outcomes than others: a
holder in the highest priority tranche may secure the accelerated return of
its principal; lower priority tranche holders may collect nothing. Absent an
event of default, lower priority tranches may continue to collect high
interest payments from the SFI (and, ideally, later recover their principal
investment).
Many of these default disputes squeak into federal court under the
federal interpleader statute. Often, cases involve parties domiciled in New
York or Delaware, so complete diversity rarely exists. The federal
interpleader statute expands federal diversity jurisdiction to require only
minimal diversity so long as certain special requirements are met.1 One
such requirement is that the interpleader plaintiff deposits the amount in
dispute with the court.2 But in large default disputes, the amount typically
has not been deposited with the court,3 so it seems unclear whether federal
courts have jurisdiction. Yet, despite the fact that some security holders
1 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (holding that the federal
interpleader statute required only minimum diversity).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2) (2012).
3 See, e.g., infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
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may benefit from raising this jurisdictional issue and possibly having the
case dismissed, courts and parties have generally not raised it.4
This silence is puzzling. In this Essay, we advance possible
explanations for why parties to default disputes do not raise these
jurisdictional defects. While others have discussed the value of uncertainty
to parties in contracting,5 this Essay analyzes the value of uncertainty to
parties in litigation. We argue that, even though unaddressed jurisdictional
defects inject significant uncertainty into the litigation, parties may actually
welcome and value this uncertainty as a litigation strategy: continued
uncertainty could keep parties in a preferred forum, drive parties to settle,
or permit parties to collect insurance payouts. Sometimes parties may
prefer that particular issues remain unresolved. SFI default disputes serve
as one example that may lead to fruitful avenues for future study.
I.

A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE

Why do default disputes continue in federal court despite uncertain
subject matter jurisdiction? Why do none of the parties speak up, even
when doing so would seemingly advance their interests? In this Part, we
unpack the pieces underlying the puzzle. We provide necessary background
about the products sparking default disputes, and the specifics of the
federal interpleader statute. Litigating default disputes in federal court
under the federal interpleader statute is like fitting a square peg in a round
hole: it’s not a good fit. In this case, it’s not a good fit, but nobody is
willing to say so.
A. The Square Peg: Securitized Financial Instruments
Securitization may be used to create a variety of financial products.
The term “securitization” refers to “a process by which an entity pools
together its interest in identifiable future cash flows, transfers the claims on
those future cash flows to another entity . . . and then utilizes those future
cash flows to pay off investors over time.”6

4 See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Black Diamond CLO 2005-1 Advisers, L.L.C., 839 F. Supp.
2d. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (declining to address whether bond was required when the complaint stated
that funds were held in escrow and asking that the court order that the interpleader plaintiff need not
post the bond); Interpleader Complaint at 17, Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Elliott Int’l, L.P., No. 09Civ.-5242 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2009) (stating that the escrow was being held apart from other funds and
asking the court to order that it need not post a bond).
5 E.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of
Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010) (arguing that parties to corporate acquisition
agreements may use vague terms in contracts rather than precise terms for certain strategic reasons).
6 Frank J. Fabozzi & Vinod Kothari, Securitization: The Tool of Financial Transformation, J. FIN.
TRANSFORMATION, Sept. 2007, at 33, 34.

285

HWANG (DO NOT DELETE)

12/14/2015 11:06 AM

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Mortgage-backed securities, for example, are a type of SFI.7 To create
mortgage-backed securities, banks buy mortgages and transfer those
mortgages to a new company, the Issuer. The Issuer then issues a new
security—a mortgage-backed security—to investors. To pay investors, the
Issuer uses the cash that mortgage borrowers pay toward their mortgages.8
Banks usually divide these cash flows from the mortgages into tranches.
The “senior” (or highest priority) tranches have their principal paid first,
and lower priority tranches receive principal payments only after more
senior tranches have been paid in full. Because the senior tranches take
payment priority over the lower tranches, senior tranche investments are
the least risky, but receive less interest along the way. Lower tranches are
riskier, but receive more interest.9
Purchasers often lack the expertise to assess independently the merits
and risks of each SFI tranche, so opinions from ratings agencies like
Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch allow investors to quickly assess the true
likelihood that a particular tranche will deliver its payments.10 The ratings
range from triple-A (lowest risk) to C or D (highest risk) and have been
characterized as “the world’s shortest editorials.”11
Under this ratings system, lower rated tranches proved harder to sell.
To solve this problem, lower rated tranches were sometimes bundled into a
new type of SFI—collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Before the
financial crisis, issuers bundled the lowest, least saleable tranches of
mortgage-backed securities together into CDOs, which were then
securitized and sold to investors.
To win triple-A ratings for the senior tranches, CDOs and SFIs often
include special provisions to protect more senior tranches. For example, the
issuer may be required to liquidate the securitized assets if an “event of
default” occurs—one in a specific list of events that might put the senior

7 Randolph C. Thompson, Mortgage Backed Securities, Wall Street, and the Making of a Global
Financial Crisis, BUS. L. BRIEF, Fall 2008, at 51, 52 (providing a general overview of the history and
basic mechanics of mortgage-backed securities); Douglas J. Lucas et al., Collateralized Debt
Obligations and Credit Risk Transfer 1 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 07-06, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=997276 [http://perma.cc/XJW9-SYCX].
8 See
Investment
Basics:
Mortgage-Backed
Securities,
PIMCO
(Feb.
2009),
http://europe.pimco.com/EN/Education/Pages/MortgageBackedSecurities.aspx [https://perma.cc/R36PD2MN] (explaining the basic features of mortgage-backed securities).
9 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 52.
10 See Jason W. Parsont, NRSRO Nullification: Why Ratings Reform May Be in Peril, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 1015, 1021–23 (2012) (providing a general discussion of the ratings process).
11 Gregory Husisian, Note, What Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s Shortest
Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 446 (1990)
(coining the term “the world’s shortest editorials” in discussions of ratings agencies’ opinions).
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tranche security holder’s investment at risk.12 These provisions provide
material protections to holders of senior-level tranches. Instead of waiting
and watching their cash dry up over time, holders of senior tranches may
point to an event of default and demand that the CDO sell off all of its
assets to repay their principal before mounting defaults dissipate the CDO
assets. An event of default also carries enormous implications for lower
tranche security holders. If an event of default accelerates the CDO’s
maturity, the CDO will return the security holders’ principal in trancheseniority order: the senior tranches get paid first. In many situations, this
means that the lower tranches receive nothing.13
In the years before the financial crisis, banks created an incredible
amount of new triple-A-rated securities.14 Although the triple-A ratings
indicated an exceptionally low risk of default, subsequent events have
revealed that the vaunted triple-A rating provides little assurance that the
product will not default.15 Indeed, the ratings agencies have agreed to settle
cases alleging that their ratings did not accurately reflect the probability of
default.16
Given this development, many holders of triple-A-rated securities now
warily eye their holdings and maneuver to protect themselves from default
risks. In many instances, for example, if a pension fund holding a senior,
triple-A-rated tranche believes that there has been an event of default, it
will seek to accelerate payments or agitate for a sale to protect its
pensioners against the risk that the capital flow may dry up as underlying
mortgage defaults continue. In that case, the pension fund will be paid first,
followed by junior creditors in their order of seniority. This, of course, sets
up a conflict between the interests of senior and junior holders. The senior

12 Events of default may occur when certain technical tests specified in the relevant indenture are
not met. For instance, an event of default may occur when an “overcollateralization test” is not met—
that is, when a required minimum ratio of the value of the collateral to the value of the senior tranche is
not met. See Laurie S. Goodman et al., Event of Default Provisions and the Valuation of ABS CDO
Tranches, J. FIXED INCOME, Winter 2007, at 85, 85.
13 See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 985 n.84
(2009) (explaining that “the most junior tranches [generally] bear the first losses from any defaults”).
14 See generally Claire A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime
Securities?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585 (2010) (discussing why the rating agencies incorrectly granted
triple-A ratings so often in the run-up to the financial crisis).
15 Id.
16 Aruna Viswanatha & Karen Freifeld, S&P Reaches $1.5 Billion Deal with U.S., States over
Crisis-Era Ratings, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2015, 1:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/03/us-sp-settlement-idUSKBN0L71C120150203 [http://perma.cc/AYS5-QKEQ] (reporting on a recent
settlement in which ratings agency Standard & Poor’s agreed to pay $1.5 billion to resolve a series of
lawsuits involving alleged ratings fraud, and providing background on similar suits against ratings
agency Moody’s).
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holders want to recoup their capital quickly and avoid looming default
risks, while the junior holders want to allow the situation to develop—all
the while collecting higher interest payments from the SFI.
B. The Round Hole: The Federal Interpleader Statute
An interpleader action allows the custodian of money or property to
compel several parties to resolve competing claims to the money or
property. Rather than making a decision about the money or property itself,
an interpleader plaintiff may deposit the money in dispute with a court and
allow the court to sort the matter out.
Interpleader actions work well in the insurance context. For example,
after insured person Ned dies, several individuals may seek the insurance
payout—Ned’s widow Catelyn, his business partner Stannis, and his
illegitimate child Jon. Ned’s insurance company may file an interpleader
action as an interpleader plaintiff to compel Catelyn, Stannis, and Jon (each
an interpleader defendant) to resolve their competing claims in court.
For these situations, Congress created statutory interpleader
jurisdiction to enable nationwide service of process and ensure that all
parties to a dispute would be subject to jurisdiction before the same court.17
For example, absent statutory interpleader jurisdiction, Catelyn and Jon
(who are both from the fictional state of Winterfell) might contest the
matter before a court that lacks jurisdiction over Stannis’s claim because
Stannis is from the fictional state of Dragonstone and is not subject to
Winterfell’s jurisdiction.
In exchange for the ability to haul all interested parties before the
same court, certain statutory requirements must be met to give the federal
court subject matter jurisdiction.18 A statutory interpleader action requires
that: (i) the amount in controversy is at least $500; (ii) minimal, rather than
complete, diversity exists; and (iii) the stakeholder deposits either the funds
at issue or a bond in such amount with the court.19
The first two requirements substantially relax the ordinary
requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction. The first reduces the amount
in controversy from at least $75,000 to as little as $500 in statutory

17 13F CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 3636 (3d ed. 2009) (“The interpleader statute . . . was enacted to provide a national
forum for those cases in which it is likely . . . that there is no state in which all of the claimants will be
subject to process.”).
18 In federal court, there are two types of interpleader actions: statutory interpleader and rule
interpleader. In this Essay, we focus only on federal statutory interpleader because rule interpleader
does not create a basis for jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 22.
19 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012).
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interpleader actions. Statutory interpleader also expands diversity
jurisdiction to its constitutional limit by allowing jurisdiction “so long as
any two adverse parties are not co-citizens.”20
The “deposit” requirement for statutory interpleader is particularly
interesting in the SFI default dispute context. In full, the federal
interpleader statute requires that in order for a federal court to have subject
matter jurisdiction, the interpleader plaintiff has:
deposited such money or property or has paid the amount of or the loan or
other value of such instrument or the amount due under such obligation into
the registry of the court, there to abide the judgment of the court, or has given
bond payable to the clerk of the court in such amount and with such surety as
the court or judge may deem proper, conditioned upon the compliance by the
plaintiff with the future order or judgment of the court with respect to the
subject matter of the controversy.21

Interpreting this deposit requirement, courts have found that failure to
deposit the full amount in dispute creates a curable jurisdictional defect.22
In other words, depositing the money with the court is a requirement for
courts to have jurisdiction.23 In SFI default disputes, however, where parties
may litigate over millions or billions of disputed dollars, this last prong of
the statutory requirement is rarely met.24 Instead, interpleader plaintiffs
often assert their willingness to tender the bond.25 After this mild statement,

20

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
§ 1335.
22 Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d 738, 742 (E.D. Va.
2006); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 2d 357, 395–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that “the
second requirement of the interpleader statute is the deposit of funds. The deposit of such funds is a
jurisdictional requirement” and also noting that generally, courts will not dismiss a complaint without
affording the parties a chance to cure a deficiency due to a lack of bond-posting). But see Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Succession of Scott, No. 08-0819, 2010 WL 4068917, at *5
(W.D. La. Oct. 14, 2010) (dismissing a case litigated under federal statutory interpleader for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction when no bond is deposited because “this Court can only assume Merrill
Lynch intentionally chooses not to comply with the statute as Merrill Lynch was aware of the deposit
requirement at the time it filed its complaint”).
23 Requiring a deposit before authorizing nationwide service of process makes sense. The court
should have the ability to effectively deliver the disputed property before inconveniencing parties by
forcing them to appear before a distant court. See 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1716 (3d ed. 2001).
24 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
25 In a recent interpleader case involving SFIs, for instance, the parties apparently established
subject matter jurisdiction by noting that, along with meeting the minimum amount in controversy and
diversity requirements, the interpleader plaintiff “if necessary, . . . will deposit the Escrowed Funds . . .
into the registry of the Court” (emphasis added). Interpleader Complaint at 2, U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Barclays Bank PLC (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2013) (No. 11 Civ. 9199), 2011 WL 6284039.
21
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each of the parties and the court simply sail past the apparent jurisdictional
deficiency.26
C. Litigating the Square Peg in the Round Hole
Many parties have apparent incentives to raise this jurisdictional
defect, but generally, none do.
Federal courts take these jurisdictional issues seriously. To stay within
their limited jurisdictional reach, federal courts may even dismiss a case
sua sponte if no subject matter jurisdiction exists.27 In this context, courts
need not wait for a motion; rather, the law imposes an “independent
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in
the absence of a challenge from any party.”28 Enforcing subject matter
jurisdiction limitations early also frees up valuable judicial time, allowing
the courts to concentrate on cases where there is subject matter
jurisdiction.29
Lower tranche interpleader defendants also have a strong incentive to
challenge subject matter jurisdiction and make the default dispute
disappear. SFIs are structured so that, should the debt pool be liquidated,
security holders are paid in full in order of seniority. The practical result is
that, in a liquidation, the lower tranche security holders may not be paid at
all. As a result, lower tranche security holders have an incentive to contest
liquidation-triggering events. The incentive is further amplified because
lower tranche security holders receive the highest interest rates—interest
which may continue to be paid until an event of default.30 Therefore,
barring the ability to make liquidation-triggering events disappear, lower
tranche security holders would seemingly benefit from stalling or slowing
the proceedings by, for instance, contesting subject matter jurisdiction in
federal court and having the case dismissed in favor of a state court
proceeding. Slowing the proceedings ensures that lower tranche security
holders continue to collect their high rates of interest during the drawn-out
litigation process.
26 In contrast, some courts refuse to accept merely asserted willingness to satisfy jurisdictional
requirements. See Scott, 2010 WL 4068917, at *5 (dismissing statutory interpleader action because of
plaintiff’s prolonged failure to satisfy jurisdictional requirement after alleging a willingness to do so in
its complaint).
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
28 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)).
29 See generally Alexander Bickel, The Overworked Court, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 17, 2011),
http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/the-overworked-court
[http://perma.cc/UMF2-KT5E]
(describing the increase in number of appealable decisions in federal courts).
30 So long as the rising tide of defaults has not begun to eat away at their payment stream.
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Senior tranche security holders are perhaps the only players who do
not have much incentive to raise jurisdictional defects. If the case resolves
in their favor, they will be paid in the liquidation. However, even senior
tranche security holders may have some incentive to settle the jurisdictional
question. Litigation of this type is expensive.31 Lingering uncertainty means
that senior tranche security holders could incur substantial litigation
expenses in federal court only to have their case dismissed for jurisdictional
defects.
II. RATIONALES FOR RETICENCE
At first glance, it is puzzling that courts and parties do not raise
jurisdictional defects, even when doing so would seemingly advance their
interests. In this Part, we present possible explanations for this puzzle and
argue that in certain circumstances—including in default disputes—parties
may either value the uncertainty created by the lack of jurisdictional
certainty or dance around the danger for other reasons.
A. Possible Explanations
1. Preference for Federal Courts.—It is possible that parties do not
raise jurisdictional defects because they have a preference for federal court
over state court. The conventional wisdom is that corporate defendants
prefer federal court: their counsel may have more experience with federal
rules, procedures, and judges, and litigation may move more quickly in
federal court.32 The parties may also believe that federal judges are better
equipped to handle the issues in dispute than state judges.33 In particular,
commentators believe that federal courts are better equipped to deal with
complex issues of law,34 and that federal courts may also be more familiar

31 See generally J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Comparative Litigation Rates (Harvard
Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus. Fellows’ Discussion Paper No. 681, 2010),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseyer_681.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
6PWS-R5G7] (presenting evidence of the exact costs of litigations, including settlement amounts and
attorneys’ fees, through 2009).
32 Marcellus McRae et al., Handling Federal Litigation: Overview, PRAC. L. COMPANY,
http://gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/McRae-RichardsonRoyer-FirstStepsPLC.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EM7J-8SUJ] (outlining common reasons large corporate defendants prefer federal
court over state court). Our own practice experience also supports the view that corporate defendants
and their (sophisticated) counsel prefer federal court over state court.
33 See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that
the federal courts may be superior forums for certain issues).
34 Id.
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with securities.35 Consequently, parties may believe that litigating under a
cloud in federal court beats litigating under clear skies in state court.
2. Repeated Games.—Litigants may also not raise jurisdictional
defects because they play a repeated game. Economics literature analyzes
the effects of repeat-player interactions on cooperation: specifically, if
players in a game are likely to meet each other again in the future, they are
more inclined to cooperate.36 Likewise, the legal academic literature reveals
examples of how access to information about a player’s reputation can
transform social interactions, facilitating the enforcement of unexpected
social norms.37 Reputational effects are particularly strong in small, closed
communities.38
In the default-dispute context, litigants are often repeat players who, in
various iterations of SFI litigation, may hold securities in different
tranches.39 A particular financial institution may, for instance, hold the
lowest tranche securities in one SFI, and higher tranche securities in
another. Suppose, for example, that the Bank of Winterfell holds Class D
securities in an interpleader action being litigated in the Southern District
of New York, and Class A securities in a similar case in the Eastern District
of New York. In the Southern District action, Winterfell, the lowest tranche
security holder, would prefer to have the case dismissed or stalled.
However, Winterfell may choose not to raise the jurisdictional defect in its
Southern District case, because the move would adversely affect its Eastern
District case, where it would like the case to be resolved quickly in its favor
and have the CDO liquidated. Winterfell need not even have another
simultaneous federal case to be motivated to stay silent: it need only

35 But cf. Margaret V. Sachs, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction for Implied Rule 10b-5 Actions: The
Emperor Has No Clothes, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 559, 561 (1988) (arguing that “[s]tate courts should share
with federal courts the adjudication of rule 10b-5 actions”). Changes to the federal securities laws have
made it much more difficult to bring securities actions in state court. See Benjamin P. Edwards,
Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 305 (2015).
36 See generally David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’
Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982) (showing that reputational effects can generate cooperation
in finitely repeated games).
37 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
277 (1991); Lior Jacob Strahilevtiz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667 (2008).
38 See ELLICKSON, supra note 37.
39 U.S. Bank, for example, has been party to a number of SFI-related interpleader actions. See, e.g.,
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. MBIA Ins. Corp., No. 08 Civ. 4791 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2009); Interpleader
Complaint, U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. AMAC CDO Funding I, No. 11 Civ. 8541 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23,
2011); Interpleader Complaint, U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 11 Civ.
4220 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011).
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believe that it could be in the senior position and prefer federal litigation in
the future.40
3. Leverage, Threats, and Gambling.—Among the most interesting
parts of this puzzle is the lower tranche security holders’ silence on
possible jurisdictional defects.
Lower tranche security holders may not raise jurisdictional defects
because jurisdictional defects can be raised at any point in the proceedings,
even after judgment is entered41 or for the first time on appeal.42 A savvy
lower tranche security holder may rationally choose to keep the threat of
raising a jurisdictional defect in its pocket to induce other parties to settle
the case. If a lower tranche security holder expects that, no matter what, the
fund will eventually be liquidated and it will receive nothing, a threat of
jurisdictional challenge may actually be more valuable than stalling the
case by raising the jurisdictional defect immediately. That is, stalling the
case may result in postponing the inevitable liquidation for months or
years, but a threat of dismissal may actually yield monetary benefits
immediately.
However, the efficacy of this threat as negotiating leverage may vary.
Trepidation-inducing threats must possess three critical attributes: (i) the
threat must worry the target, (ii) the target must believe that the threatmaker has the capacity to implement the threat, and (iii) the target must
believe that the threat-maker “actually intends to carry it out.”43 Because
the jurisdictional threat seems worrying and a litigant could implement the
threat with a typewriter and a postage stamp, the value of this threat
depends on how credible the threat appears. Attorneys make filing threats
appear more credible by circulating a draft motion to their adversary. This

40 Note, however, that there may be a systemic bias reflected in the types of institutions who hold
certain tranches of securities. For instance, pension funds often buy lower risk senior tranche securities
because the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act strictly governs the types of investments that
pension funds can make. In practice, this means that pension funds often only purchase securities from
the highest rated tranches. For a general discussion of pension funds’ investment in certain tranches of
securities, see Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the 2007–
08 Credit Crisis, in PRUDENT LENDING RESTORED: SECURITIZATION AFTER THE MORTGAGE
MELTDOWN 163 (Yasuyuki Fuchita et al. eds., 2009).
41 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (“The objection that a federal court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in
the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.” (citation omitted)).
42 See, e.g., City of Rome v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 362 F.3d 168, 174 (2d Cir. 2004) (“As we
have often observed, ‘it is well settled that lack of federal jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on
appeal, even by a party who originally asserted that jurisdiction existed, or by the Court sua sponte.’”
(quoting United States v. Leon, 203 F.3d 162, 164 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000))).
43 JAMES C. FREUND, SMART NEGOTIATING: HOW TO MAKE GOOD DEALS IN THE REAL WORLD
210–14 (1992) (discussing the most effective way to go about threatening).
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move demonstrates readiness and shows that the threat-maker has already
incurred the motion-drafting expense.
Of course, in choosing to use the threat as leverage against other
litigants, the lower tranche security holder makes a significant gamble.
Senior tranche litigants could call the lower tranche security holder’s bluff,
and refuse to settle. A lower tranche security holder may then be forced to
raise the jurisdictional defect, even if doing so may hurt its position in other
simultaneous or subsequent similar litigations. Even if jurisdictional defects
are raised, they may be cured44—and once the defect is cured, the lower
tranche security holder loses its leverage for settlement. Finally, a lower
tranche security holder who raises jurisdictional defects too late in the
proceedings may risk angering the court.45
4. Attorney Conflicts of Interest.—Other conflicts of interest may
diminish the parties’ desire to raise subject matter jurisdiction issues. For
example, large law firms in some instances encounter positional conflicts
of interest. A small coterie of elite law firms frequently represents parties to
default disputes. Firms may find themselves simultaneously representing
some clients in low priority tranches and other clients in high priority
tranches.
While their clients may not face any direct conflict, the subject matter
jurisdiction issue may pose a positional conflict for these firms.46 A firm
may not wish to raise the issue in one action because it would draw
attention to the issue and likely cause problems for other clients.47 Given
the nature of the conflict, it would not be surprising if these firms sought

44 Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d 738, 742 (E.D. Va.
2006) (“[N]either deposit[ing] the policy funds in question into the registry of the court nor enter[ing]
into an appropriate bond in lieu thereof, as required by § 1335(a)(2), . . . is a jurisdictional defect that a
stakeholder may easily cure and is therefore insufficient to defeat an otherwise appropriate statutory
interpleader action.” (citing CNA Ins. Cos. v. Waters, 926 F.2d 247, 249–50 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991))).
45 See, e.g., Painter v. Harvey, 673 F. Supp. 777, 778 (W.D. Va. 1987) (“While such a motion
should more properly have been advanced at an early stage of the proceedings, the motion is
nonetheless proper even at this late stage, because the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time by either party or by the court.”).
46 See
D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 265 (1996), http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legalethics/opinions/opinion265.cfm [http://perma.cc/WT7G-5TQ9] (discussing positional conflicts).
47 Attorney ethics rules in many jurisdictions bar attorneys from representing a client if doing so
causes conflict with another client representation. However, attorneys may represent both clients if,
among other things, the clients are informed and give consent. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT
r.
1.7
(AM.
BAR
ASS’N
2014)
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_7_conflict_of_in
terest_current_clients.html [http://perma.cc/3CRH-ZYHX] (setting forth model rules on conflicts of
interest regarding current clients).
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positional conflict-of-interest waivers from clients before agreeing to
represent them in these types of disputes.48
5. Hedging and Moral Hazard.—Moral hazard may also motivate
lower tranche security holders to avoid the subject matter jurisdiction
issue.49
Investors purchasing lower tranche securities may hedge their
investments by entering into a derivatives contract known as a credit
default swap (CDS). The purchaser of a CDS makes payments to the seller,
and in exchange, the seller agrees to pay a certain sum if the “reference
entity” of the CDS (e.g., a particular tranche of a SFI) defaults. Essentially,
the CDS functions as insurance—giving rise to the same moral hazards
associated with insurance contracts.
Lower tranche security holders who are parties to a CDS do not
benefit from dragging the litigation out—as the dispute continues, the
lower tranche security holder must continue making payments on the CDS
contract, incurring additional expenses. Lower tranche security holders
may actually prefer a quick loss—a determination of default—in federal
court so they can collect on the CDS.
B. Simpler Explanations?
Although we argue that litigants’ appetite for uncertainty may explain
why parties do not raise jurisdictional defects in these default disputes, we
have also considered simpler explanations that appear less compelling. For
instance, litigants might not raise jurisdictional defects because they are
unaware of the defect. We find this explanation unlikely. Parties to default
disputes are represented by sophisticated counsel—in one case, for
instance, interpleader plaintiffs were represented by Nixon Peabody LLP
and interpleader defendants were represented by Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
& Sullivan LLP.50 Both firms are well respected. It is extremely unlikely
that firms of their caliber would overlook a jurisdictional defect. Moreover,
a firm that overlooks a glaring jurisdictional defect is likely to suffer
reputational consequences, should their client be adversely affected.

48

Id.
The term “moral hazard” refers to situations where an entity may change its behavior because it
does not fully bear certain economic risks. For example, a homeowner with premises liability insurance
might not remove ice from his walk as quickly as he would if he did not have insurance. For a
discussion of other moral hazards in the SFI context, see John C. Coffee, Jr., What Went Wrong? A
Tragedy in Three Acts, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 403, 406 (2009) (discussing moral hazards created when
loan originators no longer bore default risk).
50 U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Black Diamond CLO 2005-1 Adviser, L.L.C., 839 F. Supp. 2d. 639,
640 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
49
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It is more likely, however, that overworked courts may have
overlooked the defect. Courts are often overstretched.51 In practice,
although courts may raise subject matter jurisdiction issues sua sponte,
courts may more often rely on litigants to raise jurisdictional defects, and
expect that sophisticated parties and their lawyers would raise them.
It is also possible that parties and courts are aware of the defect, but
choose not to address it because they find the requirement onerous or
unnecessary. For instance, courts may find that putting the amount into the
court for the duration of the litigation is unnecessary if it can plausibly
require the interpleader plaintiff post the amount prior to judgment.
On the whole, however, the argument that all of the parties are
unaware of the jurisdictional issue does not convince us. After all, we
spotted it from the sidelines.
CONCLUSION
The apparent subject matter jurisdiction defect allows uncertainty to
cloud SFI-related interpleader proceedings. Nonetheless, each of the above
explanations describes why parties to a default dispute might prefer, or
even value, this uncertainty.
For parties who prefer federal litigation to state court litigation, the
uncertainty may be a rational price to stay in federal court. If the parties
believe that, for instance, federal court is more likely to produce a
favorable outcome, the opportunity to stay in federal court may be very
valuable. Furthermore, litigants may be betting on the fact that, should a
jurisdictional defect be raised, they will have an opportunity to cure it.
For a repeat player, raising a jurisdictional defect in a particular case
may be shortsighted. Should that financial institution be in a senior tranche
position in a separate but similar litigation, it would suffer. A repeat player
may actually embrace uncertainty; if it refrains from raising the
jurisdictional defect in one case, it may preserve the possibility of winning
other cases.
For lower tranche security holders, the uncertainty may be particularly
valuable as a negotiation tool. Lower tranche security holders can use the
threat of raising a jurisdictional defect as negotiating leverage to force other
litigants to share the liquidation proceeds. Depending on the probability of
a favorable outcome if the litigation were to run its course, the lower
tranche security holder may advance its interests by using the jurisdictional
uncertainty as negotiating leverage. A particularly Machiavellian lower
tranche security holder may even use the uncertain federal court
51
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jurisdiction as both a sword and a shield by blustering about the lack of
subject matter jurisdiction in negotiations with senior tranche holders to
extract a premium while quietly expediting the judgment to cash out a CDS
contract.
This Essay scratches the surface of how parties may behave in
seemingly irrational ways because they value uncertainty or other benefits
more than the dangers posed by the uncertainty. The explanations we
advance in this Essay may help explain unexpected behavior in other
litigation, alternative dispute resolutions, and contracting and negotiating,
and uncertainty’s value in those contexts is ripe for further study. A better
understanding of parties’ valuation of uncertainty (or offsetting risk
analysis) can help us gain insight into why parties may behave in
seemingly irrational ways.
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